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MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF
PRIVATE REVITALIZATION ON
HOUSING FOR THE POOR
JAMES GEOFFREY DURHAM*
DEAN E. SHELDON III**
I. INTRODUCTION
Private revitalization of decaying urban neighborhoods is
generally viewed as a positive trend in the life cycles of Ameri-
can cities.' Beyond the private benefit to the revitalizer,2 the
most popularly appealing benefits are that existing housing
stock is preserved while neighborhoods are saved from decay
and that increased tax revenues accrue to cities as a result of
increasing property values.3 The positive effects of urban revi-
talization have usually been emphasized, however, with insuf-
ficient attention given to the social and monetary costs of
* Associate Professor, University of Dayton School of Law; A.B., University of
California, Berkeley; J.D., University of California, Davis.
** B.A., Miami University; J.D., University of Dayton Sciool of Law; Law Clerk
to the Hon. Don J. Young, U.S. D.C. for N.D. of Ohio. The origin of this article was a
paper Mr. Sheldon submitted to Professor Durham. Mr. Sheldon's paper is the basis
for the first section of this article, Impact of Revitalization. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 12-110.
1. See Rouech6, A New Kind of City, 61 NEw YORKER, 42 (1985); Housing Arises
in Midst of Decay, Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, Nov. 24, 1984 (Located in Newsbank
Microform Housing, 1984, 70:F9 fiche); Downtown Surges with New Dynamism, Kansas
City Star, Feb. 15, 1984 (Located in Newsbank Microform Housing, 1984 ll:AI3
fiche); Gubernick, Life On the Urban Frontier, 12 MONEY, no. 6, at 98 (1983).
2. Potential benefits for the residential revitalizer include making a profit by reno-
vating a building and selling it, or acquiring a rental or a home for less than market
price.
3. See U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Helping Rehabilitate America: HUD
Encourages Private Rehabilitation Efforts, HUD-PA-724 (Mar. 1983); see also U.S.
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., The President's National Urban Policy Report, 6-1 (1980)
[hereinafter President's Report].
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revitalization. This article considers the costs4 of revitaliza-
tion and proposes how those costs can be mitigated or avoided
by requiring revitalizers to internalize the costs of their
revitalization.'
One of the major costs of revitalization is that the present
residents of the areas experiencing revitalization will probably
have to move without being compensated for their expenses.
The result is a redistribution of wealth from residents to
revitalizers because the revitalizers need not internalize 6 the
costs incurred by the residents. Although researchers have
studied the monetary impact of revitalization,7 the popular
view of revitalization is that it has great benefits with few
costs.' Forcing revitalizers to internalize the costs of their
projects would both minimize the costs of revitalization and
limit arbitrary redistributions of wealth from the current resi-
dents to the revitalizers.
A revitalizer who must internalize the costs of the project
will undertake the project only if it is efficient, that is, if the
benefits of the project outweigh its costs. 9 This article ad-
dresses how to identify the benefits and costs of revitalization.
It further discusses how to allocate the costs efficiently so that
revitalizers will internalize expenses, thus enabling them to
make efficient decisions about undertaking projects. Effi-
4. "Costs" include both concrete and easily monetizable costs such as moving ex-
penses for a displaced resident or any increase in municipal services and the less con-
crete costs of psychological harm to residents from the destruction of their
neighborhood and the prospect of having to move. See infra text accompanying notes
130-42.
5. The coverage of this article is limited to residential tenants. Although commer-
cial tenants may suffer from costs associated with revitalization, such as increased rent
and increased competition from other stores, those are risks of doing business. Dis-
placed residential tenants are dealing with a basic need for shelter, and unlike commer-
cial tenants, are not able to pass on the increased costs.
6. "Internalize" means that one bears costs resulting from one's own activity which
would otherwise be borne by others.
7. These costs will be discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 74-110.
8. See supra note 1.
9. The project is efficient because its aggregate benefits exceed its aggregate costs,
thus maximizing wealth. If, on the other hand, the costs exceed the benefits, the project
is inefficient and should not be undertaken. That result is also efficient, because again
wealth is maximized since a project which would have resulted in a loss of wealth has
been avoided.
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ciency may not be society's ultimate goal,10 but efficiency in
urban revitalization would promote society's goal to treat its
members equitably."1
This article first examines the costs and benefits of revitali-
zation and outlines who bears the costs and who gains the
benefits. This article then offers specific proposals for forcing
revitalizers to internalize their costs. These proposals provide
some definite .conclusions about how cities can encourage effi-
cient revitalization and thereby treat their citizens in an equi-
table manner.
II. IMPACT OF REVITALIZATION
A. Revitalization: Gentrification and Other Myths
The private revitalization of and reinvestment in housing
in predominantly blue-collar central urban neighborhoods has
been mistakenly labeled "gentrification" by scholars and the
popular press. 12 The resurgence of investment in inner-city
housing has been accomplished generally by middle-class,
white-collar workers rather than by a landed aristocracy. 3
The result is not "gentrification" as much as it is a shift from
lower and working middle-class groups to another, but more
affluent, middle-class group.14
10. The point of this article is to illustrate what can be accomplished through cost
internalization. A strict utilitarian approach would dictate that internalization should
be where the inquiry ends. There are other considerations, such as fairness and equity,
which this article will consider. See infra text accompanying notes 107-10 & 113-14.
11. See infra notes 113 & 143.
12. See, e.g., Bryant & McGee, Gentrification and the Law: Combatting Urban Dis-
placement, 25 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 43-144 (1983); Henig, Gentrification
and Displacement Within Cities: A Comparative Analysis, 61 Soc. Sci. Q. 638 (1980);
LeGates & Hartman, Gentrification-Caused Displacement, 14 URB. LAW. 31 (1982).
13. Palen & London, Introduction: Some Theoretical and Practical Issues Regard-
ing Inner-City Revitalization, in GENTRIFICATION, DISPLACEMENT AND NEIGHBOR-
HOOD REVITALIZATION 7 (J. Palen & B. London eds. 1984).
14. Bryant & McGee, supra note 12, at 48; Palen & Nachmias, Revitalization in a
Working-Class Neighborhood, in GENTRIFICATION, DISPLACEMENT AND NEIGHBOR-
HOOD REVITALIZATION 129 (J. Palen & B. London eds. 1984). In some areas exper-
iencing rehabilitation of the housing stock, however, some of the participants have been
long-term, working-class residents or newcomers of relatively similar status. Id. at 129-
31.
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Since World War II wealthier classes of people have
tended to move from the city to the suburbs. 15 Despite this
general trend, within particular cities there has been a focused
movement of the upper middle class into older, central neigh-
borhoods. 6 The influx of the middle class, primarily from dif-
ferent parts of the city, transforms low and moderate income
neighborhoods into higher-priced residential areas mainly
through privately financed rehabilitation.
17
The decision to buy or significantly improve property in
revitalizing areas depends upon the values of the decision-
maker.' The rising costs of housing have prompted working
people to seek alternatives to newly-constructed homes in the
suburbs. The single-family home, the foundation of the
"good life" in America, is beyond the reach of many middle-
class or young upwardly mobile families or individuals unless
they choose to buy a deteriorating property at a low cost.19
For the price of renting a one-bedroom apartment in a subur-
ban area, a family can own a home in the city, turn its sweat
into equity, and be close to vocational and cultural centers. E°
In the late 1970's, when double digit inflation was the
norm, home ownership became a more attractive investment
because the inflation of home prices met or exceeded the infla-
tion rate.21 Since the inflation rate has leveled off, home own-
ership is no longer a sure-fire investment.22 In order for
owner-occupiers of single-family homes to significantly out-
pace inflation in today's economy, they have had to assume
more risk.23 Revitalizing areas have provided an increased
15. See Sternlieb & Hughes, New Regional and Metropolitan Realities America, J.
AM. INST. OF PLANNERS 227 (1977).
16. See Lipton, Evidence of Central-City Revival, in BACK TO THE CITY, ISSUES IN
NEIGHBORHOOD RENOVATION 42 (S. Laska & D. Spain eds. 1980).
17. Id.; Bryant & McGee, supra note 12, at 47 n.10.
18. See Allen, The Ideology of Dense Neighborhood Redevelopment, in GENTRIFI-
CATION, DISPLACEMENT AND NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION 29-31 (J. Palen & B.
London eds. 1984).
19. See Palen & London, supra note 13, at 7.
20. Id.
21. See Rudel & Neagigus, Inflation, New Homeowners and Downgrading in 1970's,
21 URB. STUD. 129-38 (1984).
22. Marth, A Housing Era Ends, NATION'S BUS., Sept. 1982, at 26-28.
23. Id. Generally, the rate of return on an investment is at least partially deter-
mined by the risk involved; the greater the risk, the greater the return. Home buyers
may or may not be willing to accept the risk inherent in purchasing a home in a revital-
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risk/increased return opportunity for the investment-minded
home buyer.
Central neighborhoods often contain deteriorating, older
buildings that are structurally sound and architecturally inter-
esting. These neighborhoods are typically located near central
business districts and often near areas of historical interest,
water, or public open spaces.2 4 A post-Victorian house in the
heart of the old city or a townhouse near the waterfront has a
potential for elegance that is absent in suburban tract houses
and duplexes. Perhaps a desire to live in a bygone era ac-
counts for the charm some revitalizers attach to their homes
and neighborhoods. Whatever the reason, many revitalizers
are motivated by the historic or cultural significance of their
homes and neighborhoods.26
Unless there is a good chance that revitalizers will make
money, or at least make a solid investment, the revitalizing
trend would quickly wither.27 However, many other factors
which favor living in the central city may enter into the deci-
sion-making process. 2 The belief that suburbia holds the un-
qualified good life has failed as suburbia has discovered it has
many of the same problems as the central city.29 Some revital-
izers view the influx of the upper middle class into these blue-
collar, sometimes ethnic, neighborhoods as an ideal medium
for promoting a better understanding between people of differ-
ent races and socio-economic backgrounds. 30 The manual la-
bor involved in rehabilitating a house may also provide an
interesting and challenging diversion for the white-collar
worker in search of an eclectic lifestyle.
B. External Benefits
Rehabilitating a home in a blighted central part of the city
benefits the home buyer, if one assumes that the buyer is a
izing area. For a good discussion of risk neutrality and risk aversion, see A. POLINSKY,
AN INTRODUCTION To LAW AND ECONOMICS 51-53 (1983).
24. See Lipton, supra note 16, at 43.
25. See Allen, supra note 18, at 29.
26. Bryant & McGee, supra note 12, at 48.
27. See id. at 49.
28. Allen, supra note 18, at 29-31.
29. President's Report, supra note 3, at 7-2.
30. See U.S. HUD Displacement Report (1979); Allen, supra note 18, at 30.
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rational decision-maker and thus will only choose to rehabili-
tate a home if it is in his or her economic interest.3' Before
purchasing a house, the buyer will attach values to factors
considered significant and, based on those values, make a deci-
sion. Buying a house in a central neighborhood rather than
choosing a different housing alternative reflects the buyer's in-
ternal cost/benefit analysis. That individual's decision may
benefit people outside the household. This section discusses
those benefits.
The city is an obvious indirect beneficiary of the revitaliza-
tion trend. The increased interest in inner-city housing is seen
as a key factor in the renaissance of the great American city.32
In addition to the intangible benefits of restoring a city to its
former glory, local governments have direct economic incen-
tives for stimulating the redevelopment of decaying, central
neighborhoods. Increased property values generate increased
property tax revenues for financially stricken cities. 33 Tax de-
linquencies and tax lien foreclosures should decline in revital-
31. For the purposes of economic analysis, this article will assume that the individ-
uals contemplating purchasing a house in a revitalizing area have access to information
that will allow them to consider the costs and benefits of their housing choices. This
article will also assume that the house buyer will maximize utility by making a decision
that, in the aggregate, maximizes benefits and minimizes costs. A. POLINSKY, supra
note 23, at 10.
32. Note, Displacement in Gentrifying Neighborhoods: Regulating Condominium
Conversion Through Municipal Land Use Controls, 63 B.U.L. REv. 955, 959 (1983); see
also supra note 1.
33. Bryant & McGee, supra note 12, at 48; Note, supra note 32, at 959.
The assertion that increased property values will provide the city with in-
creased property tax revenues is at least partially based upon the assumption that
the houses in revitalizing areas will be frequently reassessed in order to reflect
their increasing value. However, such reappraisals may not occur for a variety
of reasons.
DeGiovanni, An Examination of Selected Consequences of Revitalization in Six U.S.
Cities, in GENTRIFICATION, DISPLACEMENT AND NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION
75 (J. Palen & B. London eds. 1984). DeGiovanni suggests that some of the reasons are
the following:
The appraisal office may be understaffed; the appraisers may not perceive
changes in the neighborhood; the reappraisal of property may be limited by stat-
ute or constitutional amendment... [or] the city government may adopt a policy
to delay or avoid reappraisal because of likely opposition to tax increase or for
fear of inhibiting reinvestment in the early stages.
Id. at 86 n.18. "[T]he percentage of increase in assessed property values did not keep
pace with the percentage of increase in the market value of housing" in the neighbor-
hoods studied by DeGiovanni, which suggested to him that the benefits of revitalization
to cities may be overstated in many cases. Id. at 76.
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izing areas, which should mean that the city collects taxes
more quickly and with lower administrative costs. Revitaliza-
tion preserves existing housing stock, thereby keeping more
taxpayers in the city. Revitalization also helps bring deterio-
rated properties up to applicable building code standards.34
Less tangible but still significant benefits also accrue to the
city when a neighborhood revitalizes. Private redevelopment
of architecturally interesting buildings preserves a physical
link to the city's past without the direct expenditure of public
funds for that purpose. 35 Well-preserved historical districts
give a city a sense of history that is impossible to duplicate
with new construction.36 Having desirable inner neighbor-
hoods enhances a city's prestige on a national level, making it
a more attractive place for new industry, conventions and
travel.37 Beyond these benefits, there is also the possibility
that revitalization of central city neighborhoods will also reat-
tract the middle class back to the city and stem, if not reverse,
the trend for the cities to become polarized with the rich and
white at one pole and the poor and minority at the other.38
Other external benefits are also bestowed on the revital-
izer's neighboring property owners. It is almost inevitable
that the revitalization of a run-down building will benefit
neighboring property owners. The neighboring owners may
only receive the benefit of seeing their neighborhood improve.
More likely, however, the neighbors will also benefit by an
increase in the value of their own property and, if they are
landlords, the ability to increase rents in their own buildings.
C. External Costs
The decision to buy or not buy a piece of property is a
private decision based on internal benefit/cost analysis.39 Fac-
34. See DeGiovanni, supra note 33, at 73.
35. See Allen, supra note 18, at 33.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. President's Report, supra note 3, at 1-10 to 1-23.
39. This article will assume that home buyers make decisions based on what they
think is best for themselves. In order to make a rational decision, a buyer must place
values on the costs and benefits of the factors going into the decision. The concept of
the power of choice in decision making is known as consumer sovereignty. A. POLIN-
SKY, supra note 23, at 10.
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tors such as purchase price, the cost of repairs, quality of
schools and resale value may enter into this system of personal
valuation. It is not society's concern whether the buyer makes
the "proper" personal decision. However, when the home-
buyer's decision adversely affects other people, this private de-
cision becomes a matter of public concern. This section dis-
cusses the major external costs of the private decision to buy a
home in a revitalizing neighborhood.
One of the major costs of revitalization is the depletion of
low or moderate income rental properties that occurs as a
neighborhood changes from primarily rental properties to
owner-occupied units. When the owner moves in, the tenant
must find shelter elsewhere. As more people compete within a
neighborhood for desirable housing stock, the value of the
property increases. 4° If the landlord increases the rent to a
revitalized market level, the tenant may be unable or unwill-
ing to pay the higher rent and may be forced to move or be
evicted. In addition, property taxes may increase whether or
not the property is improved, because the rising property val-
ues around it make it a more likely candidate for rehabilita-
tion. Rather than absorb the increased property taxes on the
rental unit, the landlord may pass on the increase to tenants in
the form of increased rents. If the tenants cannot afford the
increase, they may have to move and possibly pay higher rents
in different neighborhoods. The involuntarily displaced ten-
ants of the old neighborhood may endure significant emo-
tional and pychological burdens41 as well as economic
40. DeGiovanni, supra note 33, at 83.
41. See A. DOWNS, URBAN PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 192-94 (1970); Fried,
Grieving for a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of Relocation, in URBAN RENEWAL, THE
RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 359-61 (J. Wilson ed. 1966); Note, supra note 32, at
961. Fried states:
Among 250 women, however, 26 percent report that they still feel sad or
depressed two years later, and another 20 percent report a long period (six
months to two years) of sadness or depression. Altogether, therefore, at least 46
percent give evidence of a fairly severe grief reaction or worse. And among 316
men, the data show only a slightly smaller percentage (38 percent) with long-
term grief reactions.
Id. at 360.
Another commentator states that displaced tenants often display unfocused bitter-
ness because they receive little, if any, official recognition of their plight. The state-
ments of one angry resident of a gentrifying neighborhood exemplified the general
feeling:
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hardship. The loss of their former neighbors and the sense of
identity the outmovers attach to their neighborhood often
leave lasting scars.42
Revitalization may increase costs to local government as
well. If a city wishes to stimulate investment in housing in
these areas, it may be required to provide better services than
it did for the blue-collar neighborhoods. 43 Because revital-
izing neighborhoods are usually bordered by low income
neighborhoods, the incidence of violent crime is likely to be
greater than in more affluent parts of the city or suburbs. If
there appears to be a greater incidence of crime or a lack of
police presence, the potential revitalizer, having the resources
to make alternative shelter choices, may choose to live else-
where.45 In addition to demands for increased police protec-
tion the new residents may request additional street paving,
lighting, landscaping, sidewalks or other items and services.46
The city may be more responsive to these requests if it sees it
may be able to offset the increased costs through an enhanced
property tax base.
What's happening to the Italians is the same thing that happened in Society Hill,
where they chased the blacks out, and Queen Village, where they chased the
poor Poles and Ukranians [sic] out. They couldn't compete with the tax base the
professionals were setting. Some people make a killing; they get a home they
paid $4,500 for, and they sell it for $100,000 and go to Jersey. But a lot of others
hate what's happening. They think they are going to be pushed out. They think,
who the hell do these stinking liberals think they are? They're going to take
over!
Bennetts, The Philadelphia Story - Updated, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1981, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 62; see Note, supra note 32, at 961-62.
42. See generally Fried, supra note 41, at 370-76 (case studies).
43. See Laska & Spain, Anticipating Renovators' Demands: New Orleans, in BACK
TO THE CITY, ISSUES IN NEIGHBORHOOD RENOVATION 116-37 (1980).
44. See President's Report, supra note 3, at 11-13.
45. People prefer not to be victims of crime. One study suggests that an actual
experience as a victim does not significantly affect the inmover's satisfaction with a
revitalized neighborhood. Spain & Laska, Renovators TwoYears Later: New Orleans, in
GENTRIFICATION, DISPLACEMENT AND NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION (J. Palen
& B. London eds. 1984). Spain and Laska also noted that "those who perceive their
neighborhood as a safe place to walk at night are significantly more satisfied than those
who perceive some danger." Id. at 116. Spain and Laska found that perceptions of
safety are more important than actual experience with crime; as long as the neighbor-
hood is defined as safe, people are generally satisfied regardless of whether they them-
selves have been victims of crime. Id.
46. Laska & Spain, supra note 43, at 117.
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In order to understand the full cost of revitalization to the
involuntarily displaced tenant, it is necessary to understand
where the poor live and the basic facts of the low income
rental market.
1. Central City Poverty
Between 1969 and 1976, poverty in the central neighbor-
hoods of the largest cities increased at an annual rate of eight
percent.47 This increase occurred at the same time that total
central city population declined. 8 In some larger cities with
troubled economies, the proportion of poor persons exceeds
one in five.49 Nearly four in every ten poor Americans live in
central cities."0 These figures tend to understate the relative
severity of central city poverty, because national poverty stan-
dards do not vary by region or location, and because living
costs are often ten to twenty percent higher in central cities
than in other areas of the city.5 1
2. Demand and Supply of Low Income Housing
More housing is needed in the 1980s. The demand for ad-
ditional housing in metropolitan areas has been estimated at
1.64 million units annually. 2 Most of this demand is for
owner-occupied units and single-family houses.5
The increasing demand for housing makes it harder for a
displaced tenant to find affordable shelter. Low rent units
have not generally been as profitable as higher rent units. 4
Even with Section 8 rent subsidies 55 and Community Develop-
ment Block Grants, 56 investors have been cautious about put-
ting their money into low rent properties.57 Besides the low
47. President's Report, supra note 3, at 4-3.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 4-1.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Office of Policy Dev. & Research, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., National
Housing Needs and Quality Changes During the 1980's, Annual Housing Survey Studies,
No. 10, p. xi (1980).
53. Id. at xiii.
54. See President's Report, supra note 3, at 5-9 & 5-12.
55. Id. at 5-26 to 5-30.
56. Downs, The Coming Crunch in Rental Housing, 465 ANNALS, at 83.
57. Id.
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rate of return, very few people desire the stigma attached to
owning the "projects." Increased demand is not likely to gen-
erate an increased supply.
Leading into the 1980s, the United States has completed a
vast, three-decade long sweep of unprecedented housing
achievement. The 1970s was the most prolific housing decade
ever, with a twenty million unit net housing expansion.58 This
expansion can be attributed to record production levels of
owner-occupied single-family units and to unprecedented
gains in rental facilities.5 9
Not only did the quantity of available housing increase,
but the quality of the housing stock also increased dramati-
cally through new construction, selective demolition and reha-
bilitation.60  Between 1950 and 1970, the proportion of
substandard housing in the United States declined from 37%
to 9%. 61 Overcrowding, a classic urban housing problem, was
also significantly reduced. 2
These remarkable statistics would appear to neutralize the
critical nature of the displacement problem. If decent, low
cost housing were generally available, the problem would be
less acute. The outmovers would still have to bear some costs,
but this price would be restricted to moving costs and demor-
alization. Unfortunately, the present rental market is tight,
with the tightest pinch at the low rent end of the scale.63 As
middle-income America has increasingly turned to home own-
ership, subsidized directly and indirectly by the federal gov-
ernment, 64 renters have become poorer on the average. 65 The
58. General Accounting Office, Rental Housing: A National Problem That Needs
Attention, 8 (Nov. 8, 1979).
59. Sternlieb & Hughes, Housing for the Poor in a Post-Shelter Society, 465 AN-
NALS, at 110.
60. Id. at 112.
61. Id. at 110.
62. Id. at 112.
63. The vacancy rate of rental apartments is at a postwar low; the supply of new
units is at its lowest level in 20 years. Advanced Mortgage Corp. Survey, 10 Hous. &
Dev. Rep. (BNA) 372 (Sept. 27, 1982). The shortage of affordable housing forces low
income tenants to spend a disproportionately high percentage of their incomes on rent.
See National Urban Coalition on the Outlook for Housing: A Worsening Problem, 9
Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 279 (Aug. 31, 1981).
64. See President's Report, supra note 3, at 5-9 & 5-31.
65. Id. at 5-7.
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fastest growing type of renting households have incomes of
less than $10,000 a year.66
Although there has been overall growth in the rental mar-
ket, over 500,000 units are removed from the market every
year, most of these from the low rent categories.67 In a six
year survey of rental units removed from central city inven-
tory, over 20% of the units with 1973 gross rents of $150 or
less per month were removed while only 4.1% of the units
with 1973 gross rents of $300 or more were removed. 68
Many of these low rent units go unreplaced. The wary
investor understands the market forces adverse to low income
housing: high real interest rates; a narrow margin of profit-
ability; and inability to raise rents at the same rate as operat-
ing costs. Consequently, the growth of low income rental
stock has been slower than that for higher income rental
stock.69
For many citizens, rent-to-income ratios have risen to al-
most unbearable levels. In households with two or more peo-
ple, rent as a percentage of income escalated from 21% in
1973 to more than 25% in 1977.70 Households headed by fe-
males pay the most rent as a percentage of income.71 House-
holds headed by females under 65 years of age pay an average
of 38.3% of their income as rent.72 Households headed by
females over 65 years of age pay 32.4% of their income as
rent.73
An increasing number of Americans are falling below the
poverty line, paying a greater percentage of their income for
rent, and competing for a dwindling number of low-cost rental
units. This has a profound effect on the displaced tenant. The
former resident may find it extremely difficult to secure com-
parable housing because of shortages of low and moderate
income rentals in most cities with revitalizing areas. Revitali-
66. Sternlieb & Hughes, supra note 59, at 118.
67. Id. at 113.
68. Id.
69. See U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Rental Rehabilitation: The Split-Sub-
sidy Approach, 8-48 (Mar. 1984).
70. President's Report, supra note 3, at 5-2.
71. Sternlieb & Hughes, supra note 59, at 118-19.
72. Id. at 119.
73. Id.
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zation exacerbates shortages by removing existing low and
moderate income housing from the rental market.
D. Amount of Displacement
The incidence of displacement on a national level is signifi-
cant but understates the impact on an intra-city level. Ac-
cording to surveys authorized by the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1980, between 0.8 and 1.1%
of U.S. households, which is 1.71 to 2.4 million people, were
displaced by private activity in 1979. 74
HOUSEHOLDS DISPLACED BY PRIVATE ACTIVITY
DISTRIBUTION BY REASONS FOR MOVE
PRELIMINARY 1979 ANNUAL HOUSING
SURVEY ESTIMATES
(UNWEIGHTED DATA)
Main Reason for Move Percent
Housing costs greatly increased* 41.8
Owner sold building 22.9
Owner converted to condominium 3.9
Building closed for rehabilitation 2.2
Rents were raised 2.0
Building converted to nonresidential use .9
Building closed; no reason .3
Other** 20.4
Specific reason not given** 5.6
Total 100.0
Non-Specific
All Reasons
Incidence of Displacement Reasons Omitted
Percent of households affected
by private displacement: 1.1 .8
Percentage of movers affected
by private displacement: 5.7 4.5
*This reason was not included in the question on displacement by private activity.
It is a subcategory of moves to obtain lower rent or less expensive housing.
74. Genung, Revitalization and Displacement: What Can Be Done?, 14 J. HOUSING
13 (1984) (U.S. Dep't of Census' 1979 Annual Housing Survey).
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**The last two categories (other, specific reason not given) contain an unknown
number of households who moved as a result of evictions or mortgage defaults,
and who should not be included in the displacement estimate. These categories
are, nevertheless, included because they may also contain households who
moved for legitimate displacement reasons other than those specified. The table
shows the estimated incidence of displacement both with and without these non-
specific categories.
7 5
Overall national figures dilute the impact of displacement.
Because revitalization is a localized phenomenon, its impact
on a neighborhood level can be quite significant. First, revital-
ization is an urban trend; the 1.7 million people annually dis-
placed are concentrated in the cities. Second, the tendency for
revitalization to occur in central, mostly blue-collar neighbor-
hoods further concentrates the effect.
E. Characteristics of People Displaced
Outmovers displaced by revitalization are more difficult to
locate than inmovers, revitalizers, and those who rent and buy
from revitalizers because of the difficulty in tracking lower in-
come households. 76 Fewer studies have attempted to track
outmovers and the findings are less authoritative than those
on inmovers. 7 Nonetheless, recent city and neighborhood
level studies indicate there is a wider range in the age, race,
income, family structure and occupation among outmovers
than inmovers.78
No discrete age group has apparently been specifically af-
fected. For example, 29% of the outmovers tracked from
three South Baltimore neighborhoods were under thirty-five
years of age, 43% were over thirty-five but under sixty, and
27% were over sixty. 79  Other city neighborhood studies
found a wide range of outmover ages 0 Elderly persons com-
prise a significant proportion of the outmover population,
which is particularly important given the difficult psychologi-
cal adjustments facing elderly outmovers . 1 In a blue-collar
neighborhood, it appears to be unlikely that an elderly person
75. Id.
76. LeGates & Hartman, supra note 12, at 39.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 39-40.
80. Id. at 40.
81. Id.
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would move unless it was absolutely necessary. It is also more
likely that the elderly will not have the means to cover their
moving costs and increased rents.82
Most present revitalization occurs in predominantly white
neighborhoods; therefore, it is not surprising that most out-
movers are white.8 3 Whites constitute 69% of all outmovers
in Washington, D.C., 90% in St. Louis, 92% in Seattle, and
93% in St. Paul.84 However, revitalization displacement is
starting to affect significant numbers of minorities. In some
cities in which it has already progressed through the most de-
sirable white neighborhoods, revitalization is reaching into
more deteriorated, primarily minority neighborhoods.8 5 If the
revitalization trend continues, more minorities will likely be
displaced than in the past.
City and neighborhood revitalization displacement studies
generally report that the average outmover income fell in the
lower middle range, typically between $8,000 and $14,000 in
1980 dollars.8 6 Studies which recorded specific levels of out-
mover income showed quite a range. Generally, the results of
those studies displayed substantial numbers of low and very
low income outmovers, and a smaller, though significant,
number of high income outmovers8 7
A range of family structures was reported among out-
movers, including single individuals, married couples, families
with children, and alternative household structures. Between
32% and 55% of the households contained children.88 Some
neighborhoods included a number of extended families and
households comprised of unrelated persons.89 Outmover
households represented a great diversity of family types.90
82. See President's Report, supra note 3, at 4-3 to 4-5.
83. LeGates & Hartman, supra note 12, at 40-41.
84. Id. at 41.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 42.
87. Id. at 43.
88. Id. at 44.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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F. Post-Displacement Housing
The most striking feature of outmovers' relocation is clus-
tering. All studies found that outmovers tend to resettle close
to or within the neighborhoods from which they move. Most
outmovers who do not resettle within or next to the same
neighborhood resettle within the same city.91
Revitalization displacement studies report that outmovers'
shelter costs generally increase, sometimes modestly and
sometimes dramatically. In Seattle, Washington, D.C. and
Portland, post-move rents increased between 2% and 13% for
a majority of outmovers. 92 Two studies found substantial
post-move rent increases. In St. Paul, post-move rent in-
creased 33%, in Baltimore, 53%.93 No study reported a de-
crease in rent.94 Although some increases in rent appear
modest, the hardship of these increases is more apparent when
rent is considered as a percentage of income. 95
Because ethnic minorities and female-headed households
have significantly lower average incomes than other out-
movers, the burden of increased rent, as measured by a rent-
income ratio, falls disproportionately on these two groups.96
Minorities or not, the very poor suffer the worst consequences
of revitalization. Poor people are less likely to have financial
reserves to draw upon to pay moving expenses, housing depos-
its and increased rents. As is true of the other adverse effects
of revitalization, these burdens are imposed on the people
least likely to be able to bear the burden.
Outmovers' evaluations of the comparative quality of their
pre-move and post-move dwelling units and neighborhoods
show a considerable range of subjective feelings. Outmover
satisfaction seems directly correlated to income. Outmovers
with lower household income are generally less satisfied with
their new dwellings and/or neighborhoods. 97
91. Id. at 46.
92. Id. at 47.
93. Id. at 48.
94. Id.
95. See President's Report, supra note 3, at 5-7 (Tables 5-5 & 5-6).
96. Sternlieb & Hughes, supra note 59, at 118-19.
97. LeGates & Hartman, supra note 12, at 48-49.
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Existing revitalization studies have relied on the subjective
evaluation of the tenant because objective measurements of
dwelling unit quality such as size, condition or site character-
istics are notoriously difficult to obtain and analyze. The em-
ployment of the same objective criteria used to determine if a
unit is substandard, i.e., hot and cold water, common kitch-
ens, etc., would be helpful in future displacement studies in
order to obtain more objective data.
G. Integration
The influx of white professionals into low income neigh-
borhoods has not produced a harmonious and exciting mix-
ture of people of different races and lifestyles. Although
census statistics in some neighborhoods seem to indicate fully
integrated neighborhoods, micro-level analysis shows these ar-
eas to be quite segregated into clearly defined racial and class
enclaves. 98 Other studies which might appear to show stable
integration actually show an integrated neighborhood in its
transition from all black to a virtually all white
neighborhood. 99
Redevelopment in Boston's south end has caused conflict
between the long-term residents, who represent a mix of races
and classes, and higher status (primarily white) inmovers.0 °
Both groups have responded to each others' presence with
"raucous shouting matches, litigation, picketing and inflam-
matory press releases." 10 1 Long-term white residents and
higher status inmovers teamed up in Philadelphia's revital-
izing Fairmont Area to keep out lower income blacks from an
adjacent neighborhood.102
Revitalization has frequently been found to produce racial
and class conflict. There is no evidence that it will necessarily
lead to integration and understanding among people of differ-
ent races and economic levels.
98. Id. at 51.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 52.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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H. Summary
The costs borne by the involuntarily displaced tenant can
be divided into two basic categories: monetary costs and emo-
tional costs. Monetary costs are more tangible and, therefore,
easier to identify. 10 3 Emotional costs vary according to the
value an individual places on living in a particular neighbor-
hood, and, perhaps as well, in a particular dwelling unit. 1°4
Some outmovers find moving to be a financial burden; 10 5 other
outmovers experience a loss similar to losing a close friend."16
If there are no controls on revitalization-caused displace-
ment, tenants must bear their own costs. Whether they
should be forced to bear these costs is a matter of social pol-
icy. Traditionally, it has been governmental policy to create,
or at least foster, conditions to provide safe and adequate
housing for the nation's poor. 107 Many federal programs have
tried to alleviate the low income housing shortage through the
construction of public housing or through rent subsidies. 108
Federal and local governments have made some efforts to mit-
igate the effects of revitalization-caused displacement. 109
The government can reduce the low income tenant dis-
placement problem with a minimum amount of interference in
103. See infra text accompanying note 131.
104. See supra text accompanying note 97.
105. See supra text accompanying note 93.
106. See supra text accompanying note 41.
107. President's Report, supra note 3, at 5-1.
108. These programs include general revenue sharing, block grant programs, and
categorical grant programs. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
109. See Note, supra note 32, at 962-63. However, the federal government's dis-
placement plan, the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act, does not offer assistance to
those displaced by private action. See 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6) (1970).
There have been some efforts at mitigating the effects of private activity. The City of
Duarte, California, forces developers to pay displaced tenants one and a half month's
rent. The City of Walnut Creek, California, forces developers to pay displaced tenants
two months' rent. Office of Policy Dev. & Research, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban
Dev., The Conversion of Rental Housing to Condominiums and Cooperatives: State and
Local Regulation, XII-16 n.28 (1981). The Uniform Relocation Assistance Act is dis-
cussed later in this article. See infra text accompanying notes 195-211.
Using Community Development Block Grant funds, the City of Charlottesville, Vir-
ginia, has developed a program to provide counseling on housing and temporary reloca-
tion assistance. This program provides financial assistance to low income families
through the use of deferred and short-term revolving loans for home purchase and reha-
bilitation. The City of St. Louis, Missouri, funds a relocation clearinghouse that has
been established in conjunction with local social agencies to assist displaced persons.
Genung, supra note 74, at 14.
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the marketplace and with a minimum number of tax dollars
by controlling revitalization so that it only occurs when it is
efficient. A regulatory scheme will be efficient if it reimburses
tenants for expenses associated with moving and if those costs
are borne by the revitalizer. The revitalizer will therefore only
proceed with a project if the benefits exceed both the internal
costs and those external costs he or she has been forced to
internalize. A regulatory scheme that provides for efficient re-
vitalization will also stem an inequitable flow of wealth from
the displaced tenant to the revitalizer.110
III. COST INTERNALIZATION As A LIMIT ON
REVITALIZATION
As the prior section establishes, revitalization requires lim-
itations. The purpose of this section is to establish efficiency
as an appropriate and effective limit on revitalization. While
revitalization may promote other values, a revitalization pro-
ject should only proceed if it is efficient; the benefits of the
project should exceed its costs."' The obvious problem of de-
termining whether a particular revitalization project is effi-
cient can be solved by forcing revitalizers to internalize the
costs of their projects. If the benefits of the project exceed its
costs, the revitalizer will proceed. If, on the other hand, the
costs of the project exceed its benefits, the revitalizer will
either rework the project to make it efficient or abandon it."2
A revitalizer who does not have to internalize all the costs
of a project may choose to undertake an inefficient project.
Some of these costs are then borne directly by persons who are
forced out of their homes or who must pay higher rent and,
perhaps indirectly, if at all, by the taxpayers whose govern-
110. See supra text accompanying notes 59-74; see infra text accompanying notes
130-58.
111. In this context, efficiency may seem too sterile a concept; the argument may be
that there is more to revitalization than just cold dollars. Efficiency, however, need not
ignore the "other values" of revitalization. The point of this section is that all costs and
benefits of revitalization should be taken into account to the extent possible. See infra
text accompanying notes 116-26.
112. This assumes, of course, that revitalizers will act rationally and undertake
only projects that are efficient. The revitalizer may, of course, look beyond a particular
project and undertake it believing that, even though it might be inefficient by itself, it
will facilitate other projects which in the aggregate are efficient. Moreover, the aban-
donment of a project is efficient if the project's costs are greater than its benefits.
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ments will sometimes provide assistance to people forced to
relocate. Allowing the revitalizer to externalize the project's
costs is inequitable1 13 and potentially inefficient.114
This section first establishes how the costs of a revitaliza-
tion project can be best accounted for by forcing revitalizers to
internalize their costs. The section then discusses specific pro-
posals for forcing revitalizers to internalize their costs and ad-
vances proposals for promoting further efficiency and
equity.' 15
A. The Benefits of Cost Internalization1 1 6
In order to determine the efficiency of a revitalization pro-
ject, it is first necessary to identify all the project's internal
and external benefits and costs.1 17  The major problem is the
identification of external costs, or "externalities," 1 " because
the revitalizer has already accounted for the internal costs.
Implicit in the notion that efficiency can be determined by
113. Equity involves the distribution of society's wealth. See A. POLINSKY, supra
note 23, at 7; see also Durham, In Defense of Strict Foreclosure: A Legal and Economic
Analysis of Mortgage Foreclosure, 36 S.C.L. REV. 461, 501 (1985).
It is inequitable to shift the costs of revitalization from the revitalizer to the tenant
for two distinct reasons. First, as a member of society, the tenant bears a disproportion-
ate amount of the cost to the extent the societal benefit of the revitalization is shared.
Members of society inevitably bear different costs from different actions because it
would be inherently costly to allocate all costs according to who received the benefit.
However, in this case the costs are clearly identifiable and the party receiving the benefit
is also identifiable. Second, it is unlikely that society will consciously choose to allocate
wealth from the poor to the wealthy, or, to put it more bluntly, from tenants to real
estate developers, which is what currently occurs in revitalization.
114. The potential for inefficiency arises because the revitalizer may proceed with a
project even though the internal and external costs of the project exceed its benefits.
115. Efficiency, as it is used in this article, does not necessarily account for distribu-
tive consequences. See infra note 126. It does, however, in a revitalization project
where the revitalizer must account for the internal and external costs, because individ-
ual wealth of those other than the revitalizer should be unaffected by the revitalization
project.
116. The following example is drawn from Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as
a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1301-04 (1985).
117. Internal benefits and costs are those realized directly by the revitalizer. Exter-
nal benefits are those bestowed on persons other than the revitalizer. The revitalizer
may or may not receive any internal benefit from the external benefits; the point is that
others are benefitting from the project. External costs are those borne by persons other
than the revitalizer for which the revitalizer need not account.
118. Externalities, or spillovers, have been described as "[tihe differences between
true social cost and unregulated price ...... S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS RE-
FORM 23 (1982).
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weighing an action's costs against its benefits is that both the
costs and benefits can be reduced to one uniform method of
valuation. The most intuitive method of valuation is mone-
tary value, but not all externalities of a revitalization project
can readily be given monetary value. Judge Stephen Breyer
states that the efficiency analysis should recognize only those
externalities which are "large, fairly concrete, and roughly
monetizable."119 If all costs currently not borne by revital-
izers are externalities, those costs can be internalized. This
would both deter the inefficient project and, if revitalizers are
forced to make direct payments to offset costs, compensate
those bearing the costs of the efficient project.
To illustrate this method of determining the costs of a pro-
ject, consider a situation in which a coal-fired electrical gener-
ating plant equipped with the best pollution control devices is
located near a residential neighborhood. To produce one unit
of electricity, the plant can burn either scarce and expensive
hard coal for five dollars, or plentiful and cheap soft coal for
four dollars. With no other factors entering the efficiency
analysis, the plant should burn soft coal because it costs less
than hard coal.
Further assume, however, that the plant's pollution con-
trol devices prevent any smoke emissions when hard coal is
burned, but permit a substantial amount of smoke to be emit-
ted from the plant when soft coal is burned. The smoke pri-
marily affects people living in the adjacent residential
neighborhood, with only a negligible effect on the overall air
quality of the city in which the plant is located. The efficiency
analysis must now include externalities, i.e., those effects on
other persons that are "large, fairly concrete, and roughly
monetizable."
The physical damage to surrounding residents 120 by the
smoke clearly should be regarded as one of the costs of burn-
ing soft coal. It is large, concrete, and roughly, if not exactly,
119. Id. at 26.
120. The damage suffered by both the residents of the surrounding area and the
city's citizens includes any physical damage to or diminution in value of their real and
personal property, any costs of avoiding the effects of the smoke, and any shortening or
loss of life.
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monetizable. 2 On the other hand, the physical damage suf-
fered by the city's citizens also is arguably concrete and mone-
tizable' 22 but is not large because the smoke has only a
negligible effect on the city's air quality as a whole. Therefore,
under Judge Breyer's assertion that only externalities that are
large should enter into an efficiency analysis, the physical
damage to the citizens is not included as a cost of burning soft
coal.
Another externality to be considered is the demoralization
costs suffered by the adjacent residents and the citizens of the
city. Professor Frank I. Michelman has defined "demoraliza-
tion costs" as
the total of (1) the dollar value necessary to offset disutilities
which accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifically
from the realization that no compensation is offered, and (2)
the present capitalized dollar value of lost future production
(reflecting either impaired incentives or social unrest) caused
by demoralization of uncompensated losers, their sympathiz-
ers, and other observers disturbed by the thought that they
themselves may be subjected to similar treatment on some
other occasion.12
3
Demoralization costs can be divided into specific and general
costs. 124 Adjacent property owners, for example, suffer spe-
cific demoralization costs because they are directly affected by
121. Physical damage to or diminution in value of real and personal property may
be difficult to ascertain but is monetizable. The same can be said about the costs of
avoiding the effects of the smoke. It will be more difficult both to ascertain and mone-
tize any shortening or loss of life, but to the degree that they can be ascertained and
monetized they should be included.
122. The damages should be as readily monetizable as the physical damage to sur-
rounding residents. See supra note 121. In an absolute sense, the damages should also
be as concrete. See id. The smoke only negligibly affects the city's air quality, however,
and the physical damage incurred by citizens may be minimal and defy easy detection.
For example, the smoke may noticeably and rapidly deteriorate the paint on an adjacent
resident's house but only slightly affect the paint on houses in other parts of the city.
The damage is concrete nonetheless, but finding the damage and linking the damage to
its cause is another matter.
123. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of "Just Compensation"Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967) (footnote omit-
ted). Although Professor Michelman's brilliant article dealt with the problem of
uncompensated takings resulting from governmental actions, his definition of demorali-
zation costs is adaptable to losses suffered by private individuals resulting from activities
sanctioned and encouraged by government and undertaken by other private parties.
124. See Ross, Transferring Land to Private Entities by the Power of Eminent Do-
main, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 355, 377 nn.89-90 (1983).
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the smoke. The city's citizens are indirectly affected by the
small, immeasurable impact of the smoke when combined
with other air pollution, and thus suffer general demoraliza-
tion costs.
In this hypothetical, both specific and general demoraliza-
tion costs may not be large or concrete, and are difficult to
monetize. Indeed, ascertaining the very existence of such
costs is a formidable task. As Professor Michelman noted:
[I]t obviously will not do to interview every potential com-
pensation claimant and ask him how demoralized he expects
to be if a given measure is adopted without provision for
compensation.... The interviewee probably will not himself
know the answer to the question (putting aside the difficulty
of his attaching a dollar value to his outrage and his loss of
incentive even if he could appraise those subjectively) and,
for strategic reasons, would not reveal the true answer if he
knew it.
We are compelled, then, to frame the question about de-
moralization costs in terms of responses we must impute to
ordinarily cognizant and sensitive members of society.125
Consequently, the specific and general demoralization costs
resulting from a decision to burn soft coal do not meet the test
for externalities suggested by Judge Breyer and should not be
considered costs of burning soft coal in an efficiency analysis.
The only externality entering into the analysis, therefore,
is the physical damage to persons living in surrounding resi-
dences. If the damage is less than the one dollar per unit dif-
ferential between the cost of hard and soft coal, the plant
should burn soft coal. On the other hand, if the damage is
more than the one dollar per unit difference, the plant should
use hard coal.1 6 The coal chosen should be that which the
analysis indicates will produce the efficient result.
125. See Michelman, supra note 123, at 1215-16.
126. This hypothetical has approached the efficiency analysis without regard to
who decides whether to bum hard or soft coal. If the plant makes the determination, it
very likely will not include externalities such as the physical damage to residents in its
analysis unless it is legally responsible for those costs. In some circumstances, however,
assignment of the legal entitlement may not affect the actual efficiency of an action. See
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). Coase stated that,
ignoring transaction costs, the assignment of a legal entitlement will not affect the effi-
ciency of the outcome of a sitution. If transaction costs are considered, however, the
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B. Determining the Costs of Revitalization
Just as efficiency was initially determined in the power
plant hypothetical by looking only at the internal costs of
burning hard or soft coal and ignoring the external costs, al-
lowing revitalizers to ignore the external costs of their revitali-
zation projects limits the ability to determine the efficiency of
their projects. As with the power plant, a revitalization pro-
ject's efficiency can only be determined when both internal
and external costs and benefits are considered. A revitalizer's
decision to engage in a project should be based, then, on not
only its internal costs and benefits, but on all externalities that
are "large, fairly concrete, and roughly monetizable."
Externalities can be either "external diseconomies" (costs)
or "external economies" (benefits).12 This section focuses on
costs for two reasons. First, benefits are extremely difficult to
internalize.128  Second, many benefits of revitalization will be
legal entitlement should be assigned to minimize transaction costs, thereby reaching the
efficient result for the situation.
Transaction costs arise when affected parties deal with each other. For example, if
the plant is not legally liable for its pollution, and the surrounding residents suffer ag-
gregate damages of two dollars for every unit the plant produces by burning soft coal,
the residents will be willing to pay the plant up to two dollars per unit produced to burn
hard coal. They will necessarily incur transaction costs by meeting with each other and
the plant managers to reach agreement. The further transaction cost of strategic bar-
gaining may be incurred where a party takes an inefficient position in order to gain an
advantage. For example, the plant managers may insist on a two dollar per unit pay-
ment even though their additional cost of burning hard coal is only one dollar; if no
agreement is reached, the strategic bargaining has itself become a transaction cost.
Efficiency maximizes wealth but ignores the distribution of the wealth among the
various parties affected by a situation. For example, in the hypothetical, if the plant is
assigned the legal right to pollute when it is built, wealth is redistributed from the resi-
dents (who previously had clean air and now have dirty air) to the plant, which is free to
make a greater profit by burning soft coal. If one then reassigns the residents the right
to clean air, one then redistributes wealth from the plant (which now must incur the
additional cost of burning hard coal) to the residents, who now again have clean air.
127. R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS 552 (1981).
128. Judge Breyer states the following about externalities:
If a train emits sparks that occasionally burn the crops of nearby farmers, the
cost of destroyed crops is a spillover [external] cost imposed upon the farmers by
those who ship by train - so long as the shipper need not pay the farmer for the
crop lost. Similarly, if honeybees fertilize nearby apple orchards, the beekeepers
provide a spillover [external] benefit to the orchard owners - so long as the
latter do not pay the former for their service. Spillover benefits have sometimes
been thought to justify government subsidy, as when free public education is
argued to have societal benefits far exceeding the amount which students would
willingly pay for its provision.
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difficult to monetize 129 and, therefore, under Judge Breyer's
formulation of externalities will have to remain unin-
ternalized.
1. Externalities of Outmovers
Three categories of external costs borne by outmovers 130
can be easily identified: moving costs, including the termina-
tion and start-up costs of utilities and other services; increased
housing costs, if any; and specific demoralization costs. Mov-
ing costs are the easiest to calculate; they are large,13 1 they are
concrete, and they are not only monetizable but are generally
monetized. Most moving costs can be shown by the actual
expense the outmover incurs. To the degree that too much is
claimed, it should be relatively easy for the revitalizer to es-
tablish what reasonable moving expenses should have been. 132
Increased housing costs are more difficult; while large and
concrete, they may be difficult to monetize. The problem is
not, of course, that it will be difficult to monetize the differ-
ence between two rents, the one previously paid by the out-
mover and the one now being paid by the outmover. The
problem is one of comparability; the difference in rent is only
meaningful by itself if the two housing units are comparable.
Breyer, supra note 118, at 23 (footnotes omitted).
Government subsidy is appropriate for the creation of external benefits because
those benefits are either difficult to measure on an individual basis, as with Judge
Breyer's beekeeper hypothetical, or the benefits are bestowed on the public at large, as
with Judge Breyer's example of public education. The external benefits are not, then,
"large, fairly concrete, and roughly monetizable." In addition, the transaction costs of
determining who is benefitted by what action, and therefore who should be taxed and
who should receive a subsidy, would appear to be quite large and, in many if not most
cases, would be greater than the external benefit.
129. They will be difficult to monetize because, as discussed earlier in this article, a
major benefit of revitalization is the perception that the city is either retarding its decay
or is once again "on the move." See supra text accompanying note 32. These benefits
may be large, but they are not at all concrete and thus will be difficult to monetize.
130. "Outmovers" are those who either are evicted by the revitalizer or choose to
move because they are unable to pay the increased rent a revitalizer will charge after
revitalization is completed.
131. While an outmover's actual moving expenses may be minimal when compared
to the revitalizer's overall costs, they may be large to the outmover.
132. Moving costs really are the easiest. The revitalizer could offer to provide the
actual moving service. There would be no dispute about its cost, nor any transaction
costs incurred in negotiating the amount to be paid to the outmover. Moreover, termi-
nation and start up costs of utilities and other services are generally fixed fees.
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If they are different, it is more difficult to monetize any in-
creased cost of housing. The problem of comparability could
be solved relatively easily by using real estate appraisers. Real
estate appraisers face the problem of comparability in a vari-
ety of legal matters; 133 the legal system would be able to use
appraisers to determine increased housing costs for
outmovers.
Demoralization costs raise even greater problems. In the
power plant hypothetical, the demoralization costs suffered by
the adjacent residents and the city's citizens did not meet the
externalities test and consequently were not internalized as
costs of burning soft coal. 134 Tenants frequently suffer demor-
alization costs when revitalizers force them out of their
homes. 135 In some cases these demoralization costs are not
sufficiently large or concrete to be treated as externalities. For
at least some tenants, there is little, if any, demoralization be-
cause they are relative newcomers and have developed little
emotional attachment to their homes or their neighborhoods.
On the other hand, there may be tenants for whom demorali-
zation is quite high because they have become emotionally at-
tached to their homes through their long-term residence.
Long-term residence should provide the key.' 36 Residents
living in the same house for several years should have the op-
portunity to show the damage suffered by a forced move.
These demoralization costs should be as monetizable as dam-
ages compensated in any emotional distress tort case. 137 De-
moralization costs of outmovers should be internalized by
revitalizers because, having been empirically demonstrated, 13
8
133. For example, appraisers must be used to establish the value of stolen property
in a dispute between an insurance company and its insured, or to establish the value of
property taken by the government in an eminent domain proceeding.
134. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 104-06.
136. Long-term residence is the key because the threshold of demoralization can be
calculated easily, and it thus avoids the costs of dealing with short-term residents claim-
ing demoralization they cannot prove.
137. Any concern that compensation for demoralization costs will be a windfall for
outmovers or an unfair burden on revitalizers would be alleviated if an outmover had to
establish that demoralization costs exceed a statutory minimum amount to which each
long-term resident is entitled without proof of actual demoralization costs. This pre-
sumption of demoralization costs avoids the transaction costs of litigation in cases
where demoralization costs are low.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 104-06.
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they may be large and are susceptible of concrete
monetization.
Although requiring revitalizers to internalize their costs
should increase the efficiency of revitalization, the benefits
must outweigh additional transaction costs139 caused by inter-
nalization. When transaction costs are considered in an effi-
ciency analysis, legal entitlement should be assigned to
minimize transaction costs, resulting in maximized aggregate
wealth. 140 Therefore, if the transaction costs of requiring
revitalizers to internalize their external costs exceed the bene-
fits of internalization, revitalizers should not be forced to in-
ternalize those costs.
Forcing revitalizers to internalize the external costs of
their revitalization projects should not significantly raise the
transaction costs of evicting their tenants in order to proceed
with projects. Even without displacement regulation, where
the tenant refuses to leave voluntarily, the revitalizer is forced
to bring a legal action to evict the tenant. The tenant should
have the burden of proving the costs of moving and any costs
of increased rent and demoralization, so the burden on the
revitalizer should be similar.
In those present cases where the tenant voluntarily leaves
upon the revitalizer's request, calculating transaction costs is
more difficult. Two obvious possibilities result: the parties
will agree, thereby avoiding a lawsuit, or the parties will disa-
gree and take their dispute to court. If the parties agree, there
should be no significant increase in transaction costs. 41 On
the other hand, if the parties disagree and thereby force a law-
suit that would otherwise have been avoided,1 42 the transac-
tion costs should not be great enough to make internalization
by revitalizers inefficient. Both the revitalizer and the tenant
should be aware of the costs and risks of litigation so that only
139. The transaction costs would include the cost of strategic bargaining, actual
attorney and court fees, delay, time spent by the litigants and others, and the possibility
that court decisions would be inefficient.
140. See supra note 126.
141. The primary problem would be the costs of strategic bargaining. Strategic
bargaining should be minimized, however, because moving costs and increased costs of
housing are relatively easy to monetize. Also, demoralization costs are nebulous
enough so that each party should perceive an advantage in reaching agreement rather
than risking a determination by a judge or a jury.
142. The lawsuit will therefore be a cost of strategic bargaining by the parties.
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a few cases should be litigated. Moreover, the general societal
gain of efficient revitalization, an external benefit, should offset
internal costs caused by lawsuits, thereby resulting in an over-
all gain in efficiency. 143 This would be true unless the transac-
tion costs would prove to be very high, an unlikely possibility.
2. Externalities of Those Other Than Outmovers
There are three identifiable groups, other than outmovers,
which are affected by revitalization: other tenants in the revi-
talizing neighborhood; owners of other buildings in the revi-
talizing neighborhood; and residents of the city other than
those with direct interests in the revitalizing neighborhood.144
Although the interests of these three groups are very much
entwined, it is important to consider them separately. Consid-
ering their interests separately facilitates determining how best
to reach an efficient allocation of their respective rights.
At the outset, assume that as buildings in a neighborhood
are revitalized, owners who are not presently revitalizing, or
who do not have plans to begin revitalizing, will nonetheless
raise rents. 145 The impact of revitalization on tenants whose
rents are raised without any improvements undertaken 146 may
be just as great as the impact on outmovers. 147  Tenants who
live in non-revitalized units should be entitled to the same
143. One external benefit of efficient revitalization is the moralization benefit of a
program perceived as being a fair and equitable method of helping displaced tenants.
Tenants compensated by such a program would be less likely to feel wronged, either by
the government through its inaction or by the revitalizers themselves. As with other
external benefits, however, such moralization benefits would rarely be "large, fairly con-
crete, and roughly monetizable," and it would be difficult to internalize them. See supra
note 128.
144. It is tempting to designate the "city" as an affected party as well. This article
assumes, however, that the city's residents and the city are essentially the same; one is
just a representative of the other.
145. This assumption is based in turn on the assumption that individuals maximize
their utility. See supra note 3 1. This is probably particularly true of urban landlords.
An owner of an unrevitalized building will doubtlessly see little disadvantage in raising
rents to as high a level as the market will bear. See infra note 150.
146. This assumes that the most likely way in which a tenant can benefit from
revitalization is by improvements to the premises.
147. The newly raised rent may be so high that tenants are unable to pay it and will
have to move. They are then in exactly the same position as the outmovers.
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benefits as the tenants of revitalizers.1 4  The case for forcing
non-revitalizing landlords to internalize their tenants' costs is
just as strong as for revitalizing landlords,1 49 and given that
non-revitalizing landlords may be free-riding 50 on the revital-
izing trend, is even more politically appealing. 51
Whether the non-revitalizing landlord is free-riding is the
key to ascertaining the remedy. A non-revitalizing landlord
may benefit from the revitalization of the neighborhood, with-
out being a free-rider, through increased rents from new ten-
ants, decreased vacancies152  or decreased maintenance
costs. 15 3 The upswing in the neighborhood is an external ben-
efit of the revitalizing neighbors. It is extremely difficult to
force a third party to share another's internal cost which made
possible the external benefit, however. 15 4 Therefore, third par-
ties are only free-riders if they avoid external costs which they
efficiently could be forced to internalize. A non-revitalizing
landlord efficiently could be forced to internalize the tenants'
increased living expenses through restrictions on raising rent
unless improvements were made, or as with the revitalizing
landlord, through forced internalization of the tenants' mov-
ing costs.' 55
Non-revitalizing landlords are thus left with three alterna-
tives: raise rent and pay the current tenants' moving expenses,
not raise rent, or become revitalizers themselves. Like revital-
148. See supra text accompanying notes 129-35. In addition, the tenant of the non-
revitalizing landlord should be protected from having rent raised until the landlord im-
proves the premises.
149. The only difference between them is that the revitalizer directly acts, and the
non-revitalizer passively accepts some of the benefits of revitalization. Each should still
have to internalize external costs resulting from any action taken in order to generate an
internal benefit.
150. "Free-riding" is a term frequently used in legal and economic discussions of
antitrust law. It refers to parties who share in the benefits of the activity without bear-
ing their full share of the costs of the activity. See J.HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS, 562 (2d ed. 1980).
151. It is more politically appealing because the non-revitalizer is, in the eyes of the
public, trying to get something-higher rents-for nothing.
152. As the area becomes more appealing to potential renters, some may choose a
non-revitalized building because it should offer lower rents. If the landlord had exper-
ienced vacancies, this increased demand should cause a decrease in his vacancy rate.
153. The new higher class of tenant may take better care of the building, or the
change in the neighborhood may lower the incidence of vandalism.
154. See supra note 128.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 131-32.
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izing landlords, they then face the costs of each alternative so
that they can make efficient decisions. They will only choose
to revitalize when it is efficient to do so. Assuming that their
costs otherwise stay the same,"5 6 they will base decisions on
current income and costs as compared to either the costs of
revitalization and potential income, or the costs of raising rent
and the potential income.
Another category of benefit and cost analysis is property
taxes and assessments. Any increase in property taxes and as-
sessments based on an increase in the value of the property
should be borne by either revitalizers or by non-revitalizing
landlords who choose to raise rent. Revitalizers and non-revi-
talizing landlords benefit from revitalization; each should have
to bear any increased tax burden based on an appreciation in
the assessed value of the property. On the other hand, non-
revitalizating landlords who do not raise rent should not have
to bear the costs of higher taxes. To the degree that non-revi-
talizing landlords are unable to avail themselves of the benefits
of revitalization by raising rents, they should be relieved of tax
increases resulting from increased values of their buildings.
It is also appropriate to restrict the city from increasing
the valuation of non-revitalized buildings where rents have
not been raised. A city benefits significantly from revitaliza-
tion through an increased tax base.157 If a building has not
been revitalized and the landlord has not raised rent, the city
has not benefited from that property 158 and should be re-
stricted from raising the valuation of it.
C. Internalizing the Costs of Revitalization
This section proposes specific measures for internalizing
the external costs of revitalization. Taken together, these
measures should further revitalization that truly benefits the
156. At least in the short run, most of the non-revitalizer's costs should be rela-
tively stable. Any decrease in costs related to the improvement in the neighborhood
should be gradual, if any exists at all. One immediate variable which can be controlled
is the ability of the city to increase the non-revitalizer's costs by increasing taxes and
assessments. See infra text accompanying note 217.
157. See supra text accompanying note 33.
158. The city has, of course, benefited from the overall revitalization of the area,
but not as to that building. If the city is allowed to increase the valuation of such
buildings, the city is free-riding.
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cities, their residents, and landowners. The three proposed
measures are: a limited form of rent control; a program for
revitalizers to reimburse outmovers from their buildings for
moving and increased living costs; and control of property
taxes and assessments for non-revitalizers. These mechanisms
should encourage efficient action and deter free-riding. 1 9
Central to each of the proposals is the identification of the
area or areas of a city undergoing revitalization. Any control
of revitalization necessarily incurs transaction costs which
should be minimized. Areas designated as revitalization areas
should therefore be as narrowly drawn as possible. A city
should first determine where revitalization displaces poor ten-
ants. This process should not be too burdensome because cit-
ies' neighborhoods are identified for other purposes. 60 Many
central city neighborhoods may also have neighborhood orga-
nizations, tenant associations or landlord associations which
could provide information regarding the extent of revitaliza-
tion and displacement.1 6 1
1. Rent Control
The first element of the proposal is rent control for ex-
isting tenants. Numerous scholarly articles discuss the eco-
nomic and governmental effects of rent control. 162 They will
159. They will encourage efficient action because landlords and cities will have to
bear the costs of their activities. They will deter free-riding because the cities will be
able to raise taxes only when revitalization has occurred, new tenants will have to pay
market rents, and landlords will not be able to raise rents unless their tenants volunta-
rily move or they have compensated their tenants for having to move.
160. In the context of land use planning, see HousING FOR ALL UNDER LAW:
NEW DIRECTIONS IN HoUSING, LAND USE, AND PLANNING LAV, Appendix 5, at 30-
31 (R. Fishman, ed., 1978); see also Neighborhood Groups Form Coalition, St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, Aug. 16, 1984 (Located in Newsbank Microform Housing, 1984, 61:C8
fiche); Self-Help Settles In, Dayton Daily News, Sept. 23, 1984, at 1-B, col. 1.
161. A city should use all available sources of information and not rely on one
source alone. Groups such as tenant or landlord organizations will likely provide infor-
mation they feel furthers their interests.
162. See generally Andrade & Curran, Towards a Definable Body of Legal Requi-
sites for Rent Control, 10 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 273 (1977); Baar, Guidelines For Drafting
Rent Control Laws: Lesson of a Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 723 (1983) [hereinafter
Barr, Guidelines]; Baar, Rent Control in the 1970: The Case of the New Jersey Tenant's
Movement, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1977) [hereinafter Barr, Rent Control]; Rea &
Gupta, The Rent Control Controversy: A Consideration of the California Experience, 4
GLENDALE L. REV. 105 (1982); Note, The District of Columbia Rental Housing Act of
1977 The Effect of Rent Control of the Rental Housing Market, 27 CATH. U.L. REV.
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not be duplicated or outlined in this article. Suffice it to say
that many commentators 163 argue that rent control is ineffi-
cient because governmental mechanisms are unable to quickly
and adequately respond to changing economic conditions.' 64
This proposal should minimize the problem. One commenta-
tor, Kenneth Baar, has exhaustively described the various
forms of rent control currently used in the United States. 65
Baar suggests that there are many issues surrounding rent
control laws, including how to assess the administrative costs
of rent control, 166 what units should be covered, 167 methods of
setting base rent168 and of determining rent increases, 169 and
removal of the unit from rent control.170 Baar is a proponent
of rent control;171 his analysis is oriented toward universal and
permanent rent control. 17a This proposal advocates limited
and, in most cases, temporary rent control. 7 3 Nonetheless,
Baar's considerations are helpful in determining what the
scope of rent control should be in a revitalizing area. Baar
607 (1978); Note, Rethinking Rent Control: An Analysis of "Fair Return," 12 RUT.-
CAM. L.J. 617 (1981); Note, Rent Control and Landlord's Property Rights: The Reason-
able Return Doctrine Revived, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 165 (1980); Comment, Emergency
Tenant Protection in New York- Ten Years of Rent Stabilization, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
305 (1978); Comment, Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley: Blueprint for Rent Control in
California, 7 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 677 (1977).
163. See generally Olsen, An Econometric Analysis of Rent Control, 80 J. POL.
ECON. 1081 (1972); Rea & Gupta, supra note 162.
164. Id.
165. Baar, Guidelines, supra note 162.
166. Id. at 762-65.
167. Id. at 756-60.
168. Id. at 765-67.
169. Id. at 765-817.
170. Id. at 817-29.
171. The author's acknowledgment to Baar's article states:
The author is a housing policy analyst and attorney in Berkeley, California. He
has authored numerous articles and reports about rent controls, including a
guide for New Jersey rent control boards, has worked as a consultant to rent
control boards, and has been an expert witness in fair return cases.
Id. at 723.
172. Many rent control statutes allow for decontrol whenever a current tenant
moves out, leaving the landlord free to find a new tenant who will pay a market price.
Baar states: "Vacancy decontrols are inconsistent with rent control policies of provid-
ing incentives for maintenance and stabilizing rents and net operating incomes." Id. at
827.
173. This proposal is for rent control that is limited by geographic area to revital-
izing neighborhoods, and is temporary because, if revitalization is efficient, landlords
will decide to buy their way out of rent control in order to revitalize their units.
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asserts that almost all rent control ordinances exempt two,
three or four-unit buildings where one of the units is owner
occupied. 74 Baar states that there are two reasons frequently
given for exempting small, owner-occupied buildings: that
such landlords are unequipped to deal with the complexities
of rent control, and that the exemption will neutralize polit-
ical opposition by a potentially large group of landlords.175
While these reasons have definite political appeal, they do not
further the efficiency of rent control. Although it is difficult to
determine what percentage of apartment buildings have an
owner-occupant, 76 there is no clear reason why such build-
ings should be exempted; a tenant displaced by an owner-oc-
cupier revitalizer is in the same position as a tenant displaced
by a non-occupier revitalizer. This proposal for rent control
therefore includes all rental units within the identified revital-
izing neighborhood.
The next determination is what the controlled rent should
be, i.e., how the base rent should be set for the purposes of
rent control. Baar found that the typical rent control statute
"rolls back" rent to a date preceding the adoption of the stat-
ute.177 The purpose of the rollback is to negate any rent in-
creases made in anticipation of the enactment of the rent
control law. 7 8 If rent control is going to work in any setting,
particularly in an attempt to control revitalization, rollback
appears to be imperative. Most rollback statutes specify a par-
ticular date for all units, and courts have consistently upheld
rollbacks of up to one year. 79 While a uniform rollback
would minimize transaction costs, 80 it would probably not
deal with all rent increases made in anticipation of rent con-
trol or made as attempts to free-ride.' 8 1 A more precise, and
undoubtedly more expensive, method of determining a
rollback date would be to evaluate the rental history for each
unit in the revitalizing neighborhood and to determine when
174. Baar, Guidelines, supra note 162, at 757.
175. Id. at 758.
176. Id. at 757.
177. Id. at 765-66.
178. Id. at 766.
179. Id.
180. It would be easy for the parties, any governmental agency, or a court to deter-
mine what the rent was as of a particular date.
181. See supra note 150.
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rent may have departed from pre-revitalization market condi-
tions. It is likely that the transaction costs of individual deter-
mination would be so high as to render it inefficient.
Therefore, the rent control proposal is to roll back rents to the
point best approximating the time rents began to rise overall
in non-revitalized units due to the revitalization of other units
in the neighborhood.
The main concern about any rent control program is the
mechanism for allowing rent increases. Landlords obviously
desire to raise rents to market levels, and tenants (assuming
that tenants act in their self-interests) desire no rent increases.
This is hardly surprising, and it well represents the inherent
tensions in any rent control program. There are two popular
approaches: either evaluate each case based on the landlord's
expenses and/or return on investment, 18 2 or grant across-the-
board rent increases based on some external measurement of
inflation or landlords' expenses, 18 3 with many positions in be-
tween.1 84 This article assumes that pre-revitalization rents are
at market levels. Ideally, therefore, it would be efficient to tie
rent increases for a particular unit to landlords' increased
maintenance and repair costs. Landlords should not be penal-
ized for not revitalizing and the tenants should have to pay
their own way. The problem is that the transaction costs for
such a specific system might be prohibitive.
There is no easy prescription for solving the transaction
cost problem inherent in calculating rent increases. Adminis-
tration of a rent control program where rent increases must be
proven for each unit might be easily assumed by an existing
department at little cost in a small city or larger city with little
revitalization. On the other hand, in a city with a great deal
of revitalization, the costs of administering such a specific sys-
tem might be prohibitive. Those transaction costs would dic-
tate a less specific system with the potential for inefficiency in
individual cases. Administrative costs are the key; the higher
they are, the better the argument for a system of across-the-
board rent increases based on an external measurement.
182. Baar, Guidelines, supra note 162, at 767-81.
183. Id. at 781-817.
184. Id. at 767-817. Baar cites numerous examples of approaches to rent adjust-
ments. The point here is not to recite them but to raise them for broad consideration.
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The final concern about the substance of a rent control
program which envisions that many units will be removed
from the control is just how they will be removed. First, as is
the case with many existing rent control laws,185 any time a
tenant voluntarily1 8 6 vacates a unit the landlord should be able
to rerent it at whatever rent the market will bear. If the ten-
ant has moved voluntarily, there is no concern about displace-
ment because the tenant has chosen to leave for his or her own
reasons. Second, a landlord deciding either to revitalize the
building or to evict the tenant should be free to do so,"8 7 but
the landlord should have to bear the tenant's costs resulting
from the decision. This, of course, is a statement in a nutshell
of the thesis of this article, and what the landlord should have
to pay is discussed in the next section.18
Finally, this proposal for rent control differs from other
aspects of the overall proposal in that, as with any rent control
program, there are significant and identifiable administrative
costs. Ideally, those costs, which are transaction costs of
avoiding an externality of revitalization, should be borne by
revitalizing landlords because revitalization necessitates rent
control on non-revitalized units.1 89 As suggested before, 190 if
the rent control function can be easily and inexpensively ab-
sorbed by an existing rent control board or another depart-
ment, it would be more efficient for a city to absorb those
costs rather than incur the costs of assessing them against re-
vitalizing landlords. The costs then would not be true exter-
nalities because they would not be "large." If the costs are
identifiable and large, they should be assessed against revital-
185. Id. at 826-32.
186. If one allows what Baar calls "vacancy decontrols," id. at 826, there is signifi-
cant concern that landlords will attempt to force their tenants out. Baar discusses vari-
ous forms of eviction controls. Id. at 833-35. That is not a problem under this proposal
because evicted tenants, or tenants who are constructively evicted, will have a claim for
compensation for their losses. See infra text accompanying notes 193-216.
187. This assumes that such an eviction would otherwise be valid under prevailing
state law.
188. See infra text accompanying notes 193-216.
189. The other option would be for revitalizing landlords to subsidize tenants in
non-revitalized units. This would involve a wealth transfer from revitalizing landlords
to non-revitalizing landlords which would deter revitalization and encourage free-riding
by non-revitalizing landlords. Further, the transaction costs of such a subsidy program
would undoubtedly be greater than the transaction costs of a rent control program.
190. See supra text accompanying note 184.
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izing landlords, 191 probably through some form of occupancy
tax. 192
2. Relocation Costs for Outmovers
Whether outmovers are evicted or their landlords raise
rent, they should be paid their moving expenses and increased
living costs. 193 Demoralization costs are trickier 94 and re-
quire special attention. One approach to the displacement
problem which adopts the payment of both moving costs and
increased living costs is the Uniform Relocation Assistance
and Real Property Acquisition Policies for Federal and Feder-
ally Assisted Programs Act (Federal Act), 195 enacted by Con-
gress in 1971. The Federal Act applies to federal projects and
state projects using federal funds. 196 The Act applies to resi-
dents and businesses displaced by having land sold to a gov-
ernment, either through negotiation or the use of eminent
domain. 19 7 Although, arguably, private revitalization is differ-
ent from a governmental project, essentially the same effi-
ciency considerations may operate in the use of eminent
domain, 98 thus making the two situations analogous.
The Federal Act is very straightforward in providing relief
for residential tenants. 99 First, a displaced 2 ° residential ten-
ant is entitled to "actual reasonable expenses in moving him-
191. The costs would be assessed against the revitalizing landlords and not their
tenants if the rental market is elastic and the revitalizing landlords have, or intend to,
raise their rents to market levels.
192. This is the method which Baar suggests is most efficient for funding a broader-
based rent control program. Baar, Guidelines, supra note 162, at 842-43. The one
drawback is that occupying revitalizers and their buyers will avoid a tax based on cur-
rent rents.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 131-33.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 134-37.
195. 42 U.S.C. § 4601 (1983).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 4601.
197. 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6).
198. Efficiency through cost internalization as a limit on the governmental use of
eminent domain is the thesis of a prior article by one of the authors of this article. See
Durham, supra note 116.
199. The Federal Act also provides relief for business tenants, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4622(a)(2) & (3), and residential property owners, id. at § 4623.
200. The Federal Act defines a displaced person as "any person who.., moves
from real property, or moves his personal property from real property, as a result of the
acquisition of such real property, in whole or in part, or as the result of the written
order of the acquiring agency to vacate real property." 42 U.S.C. § 4601(6).
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self, his family . . . or other personal property. '20 1
Alternatively, the displaced residential tenant may elect to re-
ceive a moving expense allowance, not to exceed $300, and
then also get a dislocation allowance of.$200.202 In addition,
according to § 4624 of the Federal Act, a residential tenant
who has occupied a dwelling at least ninety days is entitled to
either:
(1) the amount necessary to enable such displaced person to
lease or rent for a period not to exceed four years, a decent,
safe, and sanitary dwelling of standards adequate to accom-
modate such person in areas not generally less desirable in
regard to public utilities and public and commercial facili-
ties, and reasonably accessible to his place of employment,
but not to exceed $4,000, or
(2) the amount necessary to enable such person to make a
downpayment (including incidental expenses described in
section 4623(a)(1)(C) of this title) on the purchase of a de-
cent, safe, and sanitary dwelling of standards adequate to ac-
commodate such person in areas not generally less desirable
in regard to public utilities and public and commercial facili-
ties, but not to exceed $4,000, except that if such amount
exceeds $2,000, such person must equally match any such
amount in excess of $2,000, in making the downpayment.2 °3
Finally, the Federal Act also provides for relocation assistance
services to be provided to displaced persons. 2 4
The Federal Act requires that outmovers from govern-
mental projects be compensated for moving expenses and,
with the $200 dislocation allowance, provides some compen-
sation for demoralization costs. Further, the Federal Act
clearly attempts to offset increased costs of housing by requir-
ing payment up to $4,000 either of all rent or of a downpay-
ment on a house. Thus the Federal Act requires governments
to internalize the costs of projects relating to moderate and
low income tenants.0 5
201. 42 U.S.C. § 4622(a)(1).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 4622(b).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 4624.
204. 42 U.S.C. § 4625(a).
205. The Federal Act is not, of course, limited to providing relief from low income
tenants only. On the other hand, the $4,000 limits on rent and down payments indicate
that only moderate and low income tenants would receive significant advantages from
the Federal Act.
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This proposal follows the Federal Act in several significant
respects, yet recognizes that questions about the impact of
transaction costs remain. The Federal Act adopts an across-
the-board approach in determining what a tenant should be
paid. The tenant may opt for a fiat moving expense and there-
fore get a $200 dislocation allowance.20 6 Moreover, the tenant
need only prove the actual rent or down payment and is enti-
tled to up to $4,000.207 These rules are simple and easy to
administer, and therefore minimize transaction costs.
As with rent control,208 the question is whether the trans-
action costs are great enough to dictate an across-the-board
approach. Again, there can be no answer for all situations,
but it is more likely than with rent control that an across-the-
board approach will be efficient in providing for moving, in-
creased living, and demoralization costs. Moving costs may
be the exception. As stated earlier,20 9 and as apparently Con-
gress concluded,210 moving costs can easily be proven. Fur-
ther, Congress wisely provided a floor below which the tenant
need not prove costs,2 11 again as an apparent realization that
the transaction costs might exceed the compensation pro-
vided. This proposal adopts Congress' approach to moving
costs.
The dislocation allowance that Congress provided for dis-
placed tenants is attractive because it essentially becomes the
quid pro quo for accepting across-the-board moving expenses
rather than proving actual moving expenses. The across-the-
board provision of up to $4,000 in rent or down payment on a
house is more troublesome. The $4,000 will over-compensate
some and under-compensate others. A blanket payment may
be preferable to incurring the transaction costs of calculating
and proving increased rent on a comparable living unit and
demoralization costs based on l6ngevity of residence. How-
ever, calculating and proving comparability may not be pro-
206. 42 U.S.C. § 4622(b).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 4624.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 162-92.
209. See supra text accompanying note 132.
210. By providing for the payment of "actual reasonable expenses in moving him-
self, his family.., or other personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 4622(a)(1).
211. 42 U.S.C. § 4622(b).
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hibitive,212 and if demoralization is based on longevity,213 it
will be relatively easy to calculate.214
This proposal advocates the payment of all actual moving
expenses, with some minimum being provided to which a ten-
ant will be entitled without proof. Further, much like the pro-
posal on rent control,215 a city will be better able to determine,
based on how many cases arise, whether it should adopt
across-the-board provisions for increased rent or incur admin-
istrative costs of determining actual increased rent. Finally, it
is likely that demoralization costs should be based on longev-
ity. The only alternative appears to be a full hearing which,
unlike in the eminent domain context,21 6 can probably be
avoided where a tenant is displaced by revitalization.
3. Property Tax Assessments
The final aspect of this proposal on properties subject to
rent control provides that neither property tax assessments be
increased, nor special assessments be made for neighborhood
improvements. This is the simplest and probably the least con-
troversial element of the proposal. If non-revitalizing land-
lords are restricted in what they can charge tenants, the city
should be similarly restricted in what it can charge landlords.
Property tax assessments should therefore be based on the
value of the building as it is restricted by rent control. Simi-
larly, non-revitalizing owners should be exempt from any spe-
cial assessments for neighborhood improvements, but should
not be exempt from any special assessments for neighborhood
repairs or those applied to properties citywide. The exemp-
tion should be removed as the building is freed from rent con-
212. See supra text accompanying note 133.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 136-38.
214. If long-term residence is used to calculate demoralization it will still be an
imperfect measure. Some long-term residents may actually be pleased at seeing the
neighborhood revitalized, and see their displacement, with moving and increased hous-
ing costs being covered, as a necessary and acceptable action to further that revitaliza-
tion. Such specific determinations would clearly require a finding by a neutral judge or
jury, which would substantially increase transaction costs. Basing demoralization on
longevity, then, may be a good balance.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 182-84.
216. See Durham, supra note 116, at 1309. Eminent domain actions not only in-
volve much more money, but there is little that is "across-the-board" in eminerlt do-
main actions. Any time the parties do not agree, all issues must be litigated.
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trol.217 In this manner, the city cannot free-ride on the
revitalization of the neighborhood, and non-revitalizing own-
ers are unaffected by the revitalization unless or until they
choose to revitalize.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has proposed a solution to a problem, the dis-
placement of poor tenants by private urban revitalization,
which will not disappear by itself. As the first section of the
article discussed, displacement is an important problem, and
urban revitalization has significant costs as well as having only
some of the benefits extolled by its proponents. There are sev-
eral ways in which one might rationalize doing nothing about
displacement from revitalization: either those who must move
are poor and therefore undesirable so that any costs borne by
them are justified by the benefit of getting rid of them; because
they are poor the government will somehow take care of them;
or the displacement of the poor is an inevitable price of pro-
gress. These rationalizations are myopic and, as to the as-
sumption that government can or should without cost deal
with the problem, incorrect. The poor's costs must be consid-
ered, and the poor are not the only ones burdened by revitali-
zation. Moreover, in some situations revitalization imposes
greater costs on a city than the benefits it generates.
If a city adopts the proposed plan (rent control; compensa-
tion for moving, increased housing, and demoralization costs;
and reduction of property tax assessments), displacement will
still occur when revitalization is efficient, though displaced
tenants would be compensated for their costs. This is not a
perfect solution, but it would be a start in the right direction.
217. The proposal for rent control envisions a unit by unit application of rent con-
trol rather than a building by building application. See supra text accompanying notes
165-68. Therefore, there will likely be buildings where some units are subject to rent
control and some are not. Property tax assessments should reflect the value of a build-
ing based on the return as it is, so there will be an interim period between total regula-
tion and total deregulation.
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